On ‘common-sense ontology’:A comment on the paper by Frank Hindriks and Francesco Guala by Sugden, Robert
1 
 
On ‘common-sense ontology’: a comment on the paper by Frank Hindriks and Francesco Guala 
Robert Sugden 
 
School of Economics 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich  NR4 7TJ 
UK 
r.sugden@uea.ac.uk 
 
Abstract  This note comments on Hindriks and Guala’s ‘unified theory of 
institutions’.  One of the components that Hindriks and Guala seek to unify, and 
which they claim is unsatisfactory on its own, is the analysis of conventions that 
derives from the work of Lewis.  I argue that the Lewisian approach provides 
simple and powerful explanations of many regularities in the social behaviour of 
humans and other animals.  Those explanations can be seen as good social science 
even if, as Hindriks and Guala argue, they do not fit with common-sense ontology. 
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Hindriks and Guala (2014) propose a ‘unified theory of institutions’ which is intended to 
explain ‘not only what ordinary people talk about when they talk about institutions, but also 
how these objects relate to the theoretical constructs that social scientists use to explain 
coordinated behaviour in complex strategic interactions’ (pp. 19, 20).  This theory unifies 
three different ‘conceptions of institutions’ that have been used by social scientists and 
philosophers, each of which (Hindriks and Guala claim) is unsatisfactory on its own.  One of 
these conceptions, the ‘equilibrium-based conception’, is attributed to Lewis (1969), Ullman-
Margalit (1977), me (Sugden, 1986), and to various later writers.  I will argue that the 
approach that I have followed in explaining conventions, building on the work of Schelling 
(1960) and Maynard Smith (1982) as well as Lewis and Ullman-Margalit, is suitable for its 
intended purpose.  It is perhaps not a ‘theory of institutions’ in the sense that Hindriks and 
Guala use this term, but I am not persuaded that constructing the kind of theory they have in 
mind is an appropriate objective for social science. 
 It seems that when Guala and Hindriks say that they are looking for a theory of 
institutions, they are using ‘institution’ to refer to whatever this word describes in ordinary 
language, rather than to any specific domain of observable behaviour: they want a theory that 
can connect with ‘common-sense ontology’ (p. 20).  I cannot see why the objects of social-
scientific explanation, any more than those of biology or chemistry, need to correspond with 
common-sense ontology.  Expecting such a correspondence is particularly problematic when 
one is dealing with a concept – or perhaps a family of related concepts – identified by a word 
with a wide range of ordinary-language meanings.  (The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 
‘institution’ as ‘established law, custom, or practice’.) 
 One should be especially wary of common-sense ontology when considering 
similarities between the behaviour of humans and other animals.  Hindriks and Guala claim 
as a merit of their theory that it excludes ‘so-called animal conventions’ which ‘we would not 
intuitively consider institutions’ (p. 8).  But is this really a merit?  As Hume (1739–40/ 1978, 
p. 177) recognised when developing his seminal explanation of human conventions, there are 
many similarities of physiology and of behavioural and affective responses between humans 
and other intelligent animals.  In Hume’s words, it would be contrary to ‘all our principles of 
reason and probability’ not to attribute like effects to like causes.  Thus, in explaining 
phenomena that are common to human and non-human animals, there should be a scientific 
presumption in favour of theories that apply across species.  In contrast, common-sense 
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ontology is littered with assumptions about human exceptionalism which philosophers are 
often reluctant to question.  As Hume says: 
The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ’d 
to account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtility 
and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals, 
but even of children and the common people in our own species; who are 
notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons 
of the most accomplish’d genius and understanding.  
 My early work on conventions, which pre-dated the use of evolutionary game theory 
in economics, was inspired by Maynard Smith and his collaborators’ investigations of animal 
conflicts.  I was struck by the similarity between the way in which the asymmetry between 
‘possessor’ and ‘challenger’ was used to resolve animal conflicts and the significance of the 
same asymmetry in resolving conflict in human life.  I argued that these similarities reflected 
isomorphisms between natural selection and experiential learning (both of which are 
implicated in human behaviour and in the behaviour of other intelligent animals).  My 
methodology, like that of Hume and Adam Smith (1759/ 1976), was to try to explain 
complex patterns in human social behaviour by using the simplest possible assumptions about 
individual psychology.  On the principle of Ockham’s razor, I took it to be a merit of a theory 
to be able to dispense with unnecessary assumptions. 
 My analysis rested on two properties that human reasoning is known to possess, and 
which are common to many other intelligent animals.  The first is that, through experience 
and through positive and negative reinforcement, individuals learn to follow rules of 
behaviour that tend to be rewarded in the environment in which they are acting.  Because no 
two decision problems are exactly alike, such rules are necessarily based on perceptions of 
similarity.  Hindriks and Guala are of course right to say that human agents often represent 
these rules to themselves symbolically; but the importance of experiential learning in the 
animal world strongly suggests that such representation is not essential.  The second 
psychological property is emotional contagion – the tendency for affective states, particularly 
fear and distress, to be transmitted from individual to individual (see, e.g., Preston and de 
Waal, 2002).  In a setting in which individuals of the same species interact with one another, 
each individual’s behaviour forms part of the environment to which other individuals’ 
behaviour has to adapt.  Thus, complex social regularities of behaviour and of affective 
repertoires can be emergent properties of repeated interaction, without any social-level 
reasoning.  It is perhaps true (as Guala and Hindriks say) that speckled wood butterflies 
‘cannot invent a new equilibrium’ (p. 9); but it seems to me that, in any interacting population 
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of an animal species that is capable of reinforcement learning, it must be possible for new 
equilibrium selection problems to be confronted and for new solutions to emerge.  (The 
vocalisations of songbirds might be an example.)  In other words, ‘social realities’ can 
emerge without their being (in Guala and Hendriks’s expression) ‘collectively accepted’. 
 I do not mean to deny that, by virtue of our powers of symbolic reasoning and our 
access to language, we human beings can do more than my analysis of conventions is 
designed to explain.  Lewis (1969) shows how a superstructure of higher and higher tiers of 
‘reason to believe’ can be grounded on simple, commonly-observed regularities of behaviour.  
Thus, for agents who are capable of sufficiently sophisticated reasoning, conventions are 
indeed collectively accepted.  But the existence of the conventions themselves – that is, of 
regularities of behaviour and of affective response – need not depend on that sophisticated 
reasoning.  (This interpretation of Lewis’s analysis is defended by Cubitt and Sugden, 2003.)   
Guala and Hindriks might perhaps reply that my definition of ‘convention’ is too permissive 
for their purposes – that it would let in too many behavioural patterns that common-sense 
ontology would not consider to be institutions.  But ‘permissiveness’ is just another word for 
generality.  I cannot see why the domain of a social scientific theory should be constrained to 
fit pre-scientific intuitions.   
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